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abstract: We investigate the coevolution between philopatry and
altruism in island-model populations when kin recognition occurs
through phenotype matching. In saturated environments, a good
discrimination ability is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence
of sociality. Discrimination decreases not only with the average phe-
notypic similarity between immigrants and residents (i.e., with en-
vironmental homogeneity and past gene flow) but also with the
sampling variance of similarity distributions (a negative function of
the number of traits sampled). Whether discrimination should rely
on genetically or environmentally determined traits depends on the
apportionment of phenotypic variance and, in particular, on the
relative values of e (the among-group component of environmental
variance) and r (the among-group component of genetic variance,
which also measures relatedness among group members). If r exceeds
e, highly heritable cues do better. Discrimination and altruism, how-
ever, remain low unless philopatry is enforced by ecological con-
straints. If e exceeds r, by contrast, nonheritable traits do better. High
e values improve discrimination drastically and thus have the po-
tential to drive sociality, even in the absence of ecological constraints.
The emergence of sociality thus can be facilitated by enhancing e,
which we argue is the main purpose of cue standardization within
groups, as observed in many social insects, birds, and mammals,
including humans.
Keywords: game theory, heritability, inclusive fitness, kin competition,
quantitative genetics, social evolution.
Altruistic interactions, in which actors sacrifice some of
their individual fitness to the benefit of recipients, cannot
evolve unless interacting individuals are more related than
average in the population (Hamilton 1964). Moreover, in
a saturated environment, the population viscosity induced
by low dispersal is unable to create conditions conducive
to altruism. Though neighbors are indeed more likely to
be relatives, they are also more likely to be competitors so
* E-mail: Nicolas.Perrin@ie-zea.unil.ch.
Am. Nat. 2002. Vol. 159, pp. 451–468.  2002 by The University of Chicago.
0003-0147/2002/15905-0003$15.00. All rights reserved.
that the two effects exactly cancel out (Taylor 1992; Wilson
et al. 1992). For altruism to evolve, social and economic
neighborhoods must be disentangled; that is, relatedness
among partners involved in altruistic interactions must
exceed that among partners involved in competitive in-
teractions (Queller 1992, 1994).
This can be achieved if a kin-discrimination mechanism
allows individuals to choose social partners according to
kinship-related cues, while competitive interactions re-
main random. Perrin and Lehmann (2001) investigate the
coevolution of altruism and dispersal under two contrast-
ing kin-discrimination abilities. A spatially based discrim-
ination, in which actors behave altruistically to anyone
met within their natal patch (but not outside), does allow
some altruism to evolve but at a low level and only insofar
as ecological constraints (dispersal costs) prevent kin com-
petition to drive complete dispersal. By contrast, associa-
tive learning, by which actors learn to recognize individ-
ually all conspecifics born on the same natal patch,
promotes high levels of philopatry and altruism, even
in the absence of dispersal costs; as discrimination im-
proves, altruism provides enough inclusive benefits to
overcome the costs of kin competition and thereby enforce
philopatry.
Natural selection should in principle select the best dis-
crimination abilities, but their evolution might be con-
strained. Perfect associative learning requires a set of re-
strictive conditions (including extended cognitive abilities,
long developmental period, and small group size), which
may be fulfilled in higher-vertebrate societies (those of
birds and mammals) but certainly not in most inverte-
brates, in which individual recognition is usually not fea-
sible. Instead, discrimination may often rely on kinship-
indicative traits, mediated, for example, by visual, auditive,
or olfactive cues.
Genetic versus Environmental Cues
Genetically based kin discrimination has been found in
several groups of marine clonal invertebrates (references
in Crozier 1986 and Grosberg 1988). Larvae of the sessile
colonial ascidian Botryllus schlosseri distinguish kin on the
basis of shared alleles at a highly polymorphic histocom-
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patibility locus (Grosberg and Quinn 1986). Mice have
also been shown to rely on histocompatibility genes
(MHC) for inbreeding avoidance (Potts et al. 1991) as well
as for cooperation (Manning et al. 1992). Cannibalistic
larvae of the tiger salamander Ambystoma tigrinum use
genetically based sibship-specific olfactory signals to feed
voraciously on nonrelatives but avoid eating close kin
(Pfennig et al. 1994). Genetic components of recognition
have also been found in arthropods, including subsocial
isopods (Lisenmair 1987); cannibalizing coccinellids (Jo-
seph et al. 1999); and eusocial bees (e.g., Greenberg 1979;
Moritz and Hillesheim 1990), ants (e.g., Beye et al. 1998;
Tsutsui et al. 2000), and termites (e.g., Adams 1991).
Similarities among nest mates, however, may also stem
from common environment (as opposed to common an-
cestry) since individuals reared in the same colony nor-
mally share both. Such environmental components of col-
ony recognition have been evidenced in many social
species, including ants (e.g., Jutsum et al. 1979; Obin 1986;
Crosland 1989a), wasps (e.g., Gamboa et al. 1986, 1996),
and bees (e.g., Breed et al. 1995, plus further references
in Ratnieks 1991). Eusocial naked mole rats also use en-
vironmental cues to discriminate colony members from
those of neighboring colonies (O’riain and Jarvis 1997).
In humans, discrimination may occur on the basis of cul-
tural traits (e.g., local dialects, behavioral habits, or tra-
ditional ornaments), which are purely environmental.
Phenotype Matching and Acceptance Threshold
The mechanism underlying group recognition has been
described as “phenotype matching” (Lacy and Sherman
1983); individuals compare the phenotype of potential
partners with an inner template, checking for similarities
or dissimilarities. This mechanism (and, in particular, self-
referent phenotype matching, the so-called armpit effect)
has received strong empirical support (e.g., Heth et al.
1998; Hauber and Sherman 2000; Mateo and Johnston
2000). Phenotype matching is obviously not error proof
(Lacy and Sherman 1983; Reeve 1989). The similarity dis-
tributions of kin and nonkin with the focal individual’s
template may overlap. An unrelated immigrant met on
the natal patch might turn out to be, by chance, more
similar to the focal individual than a related resident. Two
types of errors are therefore possible: that of accepting an
undesirable partner and that of rejecting a desirable one.
Natural selection should favor the evolution of an optimal
acceptance threshold (similarity level above which poten-
tial partners are accepted) that minimizes the two types
of errors. However, depending on the costs and benefits
of altruism, these errors presumably have not the same
importance and should be weighed differentially.
Investigating evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) for
acceptance thresholds under a variety of scenarios (“rec-
ognition contexts”), Reeve (1989) showed these to depend
on the relatedness of actor to potential recipients, the rel-
ative frequency of interactions with differently related clas-
ses of recipients, and the fitness consequences of accepting
or rejecting a potential recipient. Namely, acceptance
thresholds should decrease (i.e., actors be more tolerant)
with increasing relatedness to desirable recipients, fre-
quency of interactions with them (relative to those with
nondesirable partners), and benefits of altruism.
Complex Interactions
Relatedness, interaction frequencies, altruism investments,
and similarity distributions were fixed quantities in Reeve’s
(1989) model. However, as argued below, all four would
be more realistically considered as interacting variables and
are expected to coevolve with acceptance thresholds.
First, the optimal level of altruism conceded, and
thereby both the costs and benefits involved in altruistic
interactions should depend on the frequency of errors
when conceding altruism (a function of both similarity
distributions and threshold value), in addition to their
dependence on relatedness and interaction frequencies.
Second, the frequency of interactions with kin versus
nonkin (or less kin) is determined by population viscosity
and dispersal patterns, which, in turn, depend on relat-
edness and altruism. While the kin-competition pressure
induced by local relatedness enforces dispersal (Hamilton
and May 1977), the benefits of altruistic interactions with
kin may restrain it (the “benefits-of-philopatry”; Stacey
and Ligon 1991).
Third, relatedness itself is a dynamic variable, depending
on dispersal patterns, benefits of altruism, and error rate.
Indeed, residents are always more likely than immigrants
to interact with relatives. High benefits as well as low error
rates thus increase the fitness of residents (their relative
contribution to local gene pool), which boosts local
relatedness.
Last, similarity distributions are expected to depend on
local relatedness, insofar as recognition traits have a genetic
component. The higher the dispersal rates, the lower the
genetic component of similarity among patch mates, and
the more overlap between similarity distributions of im-
migrants and residents. This should presumably refrain
the evolution of altruism and thereby further boost
dispersal.
In this article, we formalize the coevolutionary patterns
between altruism, dispersal, and acceptance threshold,
while accounting for the dynamic component of related-
ness and similarity distributions. This allows us to evaluate
the role of the number of recognition traits and their ar-
chitecture (i.e., their heritability, as well as the part of
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similarity among patch mates due to common environ-
ment) in the establishment of social interactions. We in-
vestigate, in particular, whether and how much phenotypic
overlap in indicative traits among residents and immi-
grants may impede the evolution of altruism, and we es-
timate how dispersal costs and local group sizes may affect
the outcome of evolutionary paths.
The Model
Model Organism
We consider diploid individuals living in patches of limited
size (say, N breeding spots per patch), which induces local
kin structures. Patches are numerous enough that co-
ancestry among them can be neglected (infinite-island
population model). The life cycle is annual, with events
occurring in the following order:
Offspring spend a juvenile period in their place of birth,
where they fully develop phenotypic features. Similarity
among patch mates arises from common genes and/or
environment.
At maturity, they disperse before reproduction with
probability x (that may evolve) and survive dispersal with
probability s. Individuals disperse at random with respect
to which patch is reached, then mate at random on that
patch. Males take no further role in reproduction.
Resident and immigrant females then compete on each
patch for the N breeding spots.
Social interactions occur pairwise among successful fe-
males. Individuals meet a potential recipient, and based
on phenotype matching (see “Phenotype Matching”), ei-
ther accept it (i.e., provide altruism) or reject it (provide
nothing).
Fecundity is affected by the outcome of altruism. The
baseline fecundity of the focal female is devaluated by an
amount C if she provided help and incremented by an
amount B if she benefited from the help of a patch mate.
(Symbols are defined in table A1.)
Phenotype Matching
Phenotype matching relies on the similarity between the
focal individual and potential recipients with respect to a
series (say, n) of uncorrelated recognition traits. This sec-
tion is aimed at generating the distribution of similarities
for immigrants and residents. Traits are assumed to be
normally distributed and comprise both environmental
and genetic components (the latter are assumed to be
additive only, for simplicity):
z p a  e , (1a)● ● ●
where is the phenotypic value of a trait in a focal in-z●
dividual born on patch j, is its genetic componenta●
(breeding value), and is its environmental component.e●
To simplify notations (and without loss of generality), phe-
notypic values are standardized over the whole population
(i.e., they have grand mean 0 and variance 1). Different
patches present different distributions because both the
genetic and the environmental components have a
between-group and a within-group part:
a p a  a , (1b)● j 
e p e  e , (1c)● j 
where aj is the average breeding value in patch j and isa 
the deviation of the focal individual’s breeding value from
its patch average. Similarly, ej is the average environmental
value in patch j, and is the individual environmentale 
deviation from it.
From the point of view of a focal individual, the max-
imum likelihood estimate of its similarity with a patch
mate y is given by the coefficient of regression h (Lynch
and Walsh 1998, app. 4) of the phenotype of y on its own
phenotype:
 (a  a  e  e )(a  a  e  e )j y j y j  j 
hp , (2a)
2 (a  a  e  e )j  j 
where ay and ey are the deviations of individual y from
patch-average breeding and environmental values, respec-
tively, and sums are taken over the n recognition traits.
As traits are standardized and uncorrelated, the expecta-
tion of h is given by
2 2j  ja eb bh¯p , (2b)
2jz
where the expected variance within individuals over traits
( ) equals 1. This variance splits up into several com-2jz
ponents: , where is the total2 2 2 2 2 2j p j  j j p j  jz a e a a ab w
genetic variance and is the total environ-2 2 2j p j  je e eb w
mental variance. The terms and represent the2 2j ja ab w
between- and within-group components of genetic vari-
ance, respectively, while and represent the between-2 2j je eb w
and within-group components of environmental variance.
No covariances appear in (2b) because genetic and en-
vironmental components are assumed independent, and
individual deviations are residual variables. Equation (2b)
may be written as
2 2h¯p rh  e(1 h ), (2c)
where measures the relatedness of2 2 2rp cov /j p j /ja a a ab
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Figure 1: Distributions of similarities (as estimated by the focal indi-
vidual) with immigrants (u; left curve) and residents (g ; right curve). The
former is centered on 0 and the latter on , the expected similarity amongh¯
patch mates stemming from both common genes and common envi-
ronment. Sampling recognition traits creates variance around expecta-
tions, which makes distributions overlap to some extent. A low number
of recognition traits (n p 3 in B as opposed to 10 in A and C) and a
low similarity among patch mates ( in A and B as opposed toh¯p 0.3
0.7 in C) increase overlap and thus lower discrimination ability. Altruism
is only provided if similarity with potential recipients exceeds a threshold
t (bold vertical line). Thus, immigrants are accepted with probability U
(horizontally dashed area) and residents with probability G (vertically
dashed area).
the focal individual to its patch mates, obtained as the
regression of breeding values (equal to the proportion of
genetic variance due to among-patches differences),
is the heritability of the traits (proportion2 2 2h p j /ja z
of phenotypic variance that is additive genetic), ep
is the proportion of environmental var-2 2 2cov /j p j /je e e eb
iance due to among-patches differences, and 21 h p
is the proportion of phenotypic variance in recog-2 2j /je z
nition traits that is due to environment.
The expectation of h among individuals stemming from
different patches equals 0 (because they share neither genes
nor environment) and lies between 0 and 1 among patch
mates who share some of their genes and some of their
environment. If individuals could evaluate an infinite
number of recognition traits, their estimate of similarity
(h) would exactly match so that immigrants would beh¯
recognized unambiguously from residents. However, only
a limited number of traits can be evaluated, which creates
a sampling variance around and makes recognition lessh¯
straightforward. The sampling variance of the coefficient
of regression h of y on z is given by
2j1 y2 2j p  r ,h 2( )n jz
where n is the number of traits sampled and r is the
correlation coefficient between y and z (Lynch and Walsh
1998, their eq. [A1.20a]). Because we standardized traits
so that (and ), this sampling variance2 2 ¯j p j p 1 rp hz y
reduces to
2¯1 h
2j p . (3)h n
Figure 1 illustrates the normal distribution of perceived
similarities with both immigrants (u) and residents (g) for
different numbers of traits sampled and similarity values.
As can be seen, the two distributions may overlap (some
immigrants appearing more similar to the focal individual
than do some residents) to the extent that few traits are
sampled (fig. 1B), and similarity among patch mates is
low (fig. 1C). A threshold t allows the separation of two
sets of potential recipients according to their estimated
similarity, altruism being conceded only if recipients are
more similar than t to the focal individual. This occurs
with probability Gt (integral of the curve g right of t) if
the potential recipient is resident and with probability Ut
(integral of u right of t) if it is immigrant. This threshold
is one of the evolving traits in our model.
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Figure 2: Benefits (B) and costs (C) of altruism as functions of investment
p, here modeled as power functions and . Values of0.4 3Bp p Cp p
exponents were chosen so that marginal benefits (slope of B) exceed
marginal costs (slope of C) at low investment values, while the reverse
occurs at high investment values. The vertical line signals the investment
value for which the marginal cost to the actor equalizes the marginal
benefit to the recipient ( ).bp c
Altruism
Another trait to evolve is altruism, conceived here as in
Perrin and Lehmann (2001). A level p of investment is
conceded, which translates into costs C to the actor and
benefits B to the recipient, modeled in our simulations as
power functions of p (fig. 2). To ensure some scope for
altruism, the coefficients were chosen so that marginal
benefits ( ) exceed marginal costs ( )bp dB/dp cp dC/dp
at low investment values, while the reverse occurs at high
investment values. This is to be expected whenever fitness
is a saturating function of the resource traded.
Direct Fitness
Evolutionarily stable (ES) strategies for the three coevolv-
ing traits (dispersal x, altruism p, and acceptance threshold
t) are obtained using the direct-fitness approach developed
by Frank and Taylor (Taylor and Frank 1996; Frank 1997,
1998), writing first the fitness of the focal female as aw●
function of the traits (here, assumed to be genetically un-
linked):
w p w(x , x , p , p , t , t ),● ● j ● j ● j
where the traits are subscript when expressed in the focal•
individual and subscript j when expressed in females from
the same patch, who share the genes of the focal female
with probability r. This fitness function is built by noting
the following:
The focal female disperses with probability and sur-x●
vives to reach another patch with probability s. She then
competes for N breeding spots among Nm(1 x xs)
unrelated individuals, m being the fecundity of the parental
generation in an average patch. Interactions occur only
with nonkin, who are mistakenly accepted with probability
at cost and mistakenly accept the focal female withU Ct● p●
probability Ut, thus providing her a benefit Bp. Both costs
and benefits affect her baseline fecundity m0.
The focal female stays philopatric with probability
, in which case she competes for N breeding spots(1 x )●
among other females (from whichN(m [1 x ]mxs)p t jj j
are also resident), being the averageNm [1 x ] mp t j p tj j j j
fecundity of the parental generation in the focal patch (a
function of their altruism and threshold).
With probability , this resi-k p (1 x )/(1 x  sx)x j jj
dent focal female meets a coresident and accepts her with
probability , thus performing altruism at cost . Con-G Ct● p●
versely, a resident met by the focal female will accept her
with probability , thereby providing her an amount ofGtj
help .Bpj
With probability , the focal female interacts˜k { 1 kx xj j
with an immigrant and accepts her (mistakenly) with
probability (which costs her ). Conversely, the im-U Ct● p●
migrant makes the same error with probability Ut, thus
providing her Bp.
Collecting all the above terms establishes the direct fitness
function of the focal female:
(1 x )m x sm● r● ● i●w p  , (4)● m (1 x )mxs m(1 x xs)p t jj j
where is˜m pm  k (G B G C ) k (U B U C )r● 0 x t p t● p● x t p t● p●j j j j
her fecundity if she reproduces as a resident, and m pi●
is her fecundity if she reproduces as anm U B U C0 t p t● p●
immigrant. The corresponding values for average females
are and˜m p m  (k G  k U )(B  C ) m p m r 0 x t x t p p i 0
, respectively. The productivity of the parentalU(B  C )t p p
generation in an average patch is ˜mp k m  k m px r x i
, while that in the focal2 2m  (k G  [1 k ]U )(B  C )0 x t x t p p
patch is given by 2 2m p m  (k G  [1 k ]U )(B p t 0 x t x t pj j j j j
. As can be seen, patch productivity increases with socialC )pj
interactions. Part of these benefits of altruism are exported
since dispersal occurs before competition. A purely local
population regulation would have prevented the emergence
of altruism.
Analyses
ES Altruism
Holding the other traits x and t constant, the fitness func-
tion is obtained from equation (4) asw (p , p )● ● j
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˜m  kG(B  C ) kU(B  C )0 p p● p p●jw p (1 x)p●
˜m xmxspj
m  U(B  C )0 p p●
 xs . (5a)
˜m(x xs)
Taking the partial derivative of (5a) with respect to p●
and pj leads to the direct and indirect selective pressures,
respectively (Frank 1998). Because these pressures are only
derived in order to obtain the ESS, we only provide them
at , which considerably simplifies notationsp p p p p● j
and is always true at equilibrium. The direct selective pres-
sure thus becomes
2 2w c[k G (1 k )U]p●p , (5b)
p m●
while the indirect selective pressure is
2 2 2w k {Gb m [k G (1 k )U](b c)}p● rp , (5c)
p mj
where and designate the marginalcp dC/dp bp dB/dp
costs and benefits of altruism (slope of the curves in fig.
2), and is the fecundity of a resident femalem p m /mr r
relative to that of an average female breeding on the patch.
The total selective pressure on the gene for altruism is
dwp●p
dp●
2 2 2 2 2 2c[k G (1 k )U] r{k Gb k m (b c)[k G (1 k )U]}r ,
m
(5d)
where r is the relatedness of the focal female to her patch
mates, obtained as noted above as the regression of the
breeding value of patch mates on that of the focal indi-
vidual (Frank 1998). Setting this selective pressure to 0
yields the ESS level of altruism
2rbgp c rk (b c)m , (5e)r
where b and c are functions of altruism p and
2k G
gp (5f)
2 2k G (1 k )U
is the proportion of altruistic interactions that are not
mistaken. Equation (5e) receives the intuitive interpreta-
tion that the marginal indirect benefits gained from altru-
ism (left-hand side) must match the direct marginal costs
(c) plus those induced by the additional kin competition
stemming from altruism. It reduces to the equation (4d)
of Perrin and Lehmann (2001) when perfect discrimina-
tion ( and so that ) allows altruisticGp 1 Up 0 gp 1
acts to be always directed toward coresidents and to Perrin
and Lehmann’s equation (A1d) in absence of discrimi-
nation ( so that and ), implying zero2Gp U gp k m p 1r
altruism. It is also worth noting that the selective pressure
on altruism vanishes (i.e., altruism becomes a neutral char-
acter) as philopatry reaches unity. Equation (5e) is always
satisfied when , whatever the value of p.kp rp 1
ES Dispersal
Holding other traits (p and t) constant allows the fitness
function from equation (4) asw (x , x )● ● j
˜m  (k G k U)(B C)0 x xj jw p (1 x )x● ● m(1 x  xs)j
m  U(B C)0 x s . (6a)● m(1 x xs)
The direct selective pressure is obtained by the partial
derivative of (6a) with respect to (again calculated atx●
):x p x p x● j
w [m U(BC)](s 1) k(GU)(BC)x● 0p .
x m(1 x xs)●
(6b)
The indirect selective pressure is similarly obtained by
the partial derivative of (6a) with respect to xj:
w k(k 1)(G U)(B C) kmx● rp . (6c)
x m(1 x xs)j
The total selective pressure on dispersal thus becomes
dwx●p
dx●
(s 1)[m U(B C)] k(GU)(B C)[1 r(1 k)] rkm0 r .
m(1 x xs)
(6d)
By setting this derivative to 0, the ES dispersal level
becomes
Kin Recognition by Phenotype Matching 457
˜s˜ ap r[k(1 a) ka], (6e)
where k is a function of dispersal x and
m m k(G U)(B C)r i
ap p (6f)
m m  U(B C)i 0
is the relative gain in fecundity of residents over immi-
grants stemming from social interactions. Equation (6e)
gets the intuitive interpretation that, at equilibrium, the
inclusive costs of dispersal must match those resulting
from local resource competition. Inclusive dispersal costs
(left-hand side) consist of both mortality ( ) plus the directs˜
fecundity loss of not benefiting from the altruism of co-
residents. Kin competition (right-hand side) also includes
two terms: the breeding spot left behind by the dispersing
female will be seized with probability k by a related female
(conducing to a relative gain in fecundity of for this1 a
female) and with probability by an immigrant (so1 k
that related females will lose one opportunity of interaction
and thereby lose a offspring).
Note that equation (6e) reduces to equation (4h) in
Perrin and Lehmann (2001) when discrimination becomes
perfect ( and ) and reduces to the classicalGp 1 Up 0
result ( ) of Frank (1986) and Taylor (1988) whens˜p rk
discrimination is absent ( so that ). Note alsoGp U ap 0
that the net benefits of altruism always select for philo-
patry. Increasing weights the left-hand side of (6e) (in-a
clusive costs of dispersal) more than the right-hand side
(benefits of dispersal) unless philopatry is complete
( , which cannot happen unless dispersal incursrp kp 1
complete mortality, ).s˜p 1
ES Threshold
The relevant fitness function, , is obtained fromw (t , t )t● ● j
equation (4) while holding all other traits (x, p) constant:
˜m  k(G BG C) k(U BU C)j0 t t● t t●w p (1 x)t●
˜m xmxstj
m U BU C0 t t● xs . (7a)
˜m(x xs)
The direct selective pressure on the threshold value t
(evaluated at ) ist p t p t● j
2 2w k gC (1 k )uCt●p , (7b)
t m●
while the indirect selective pressure is
2 2 2 2w k gB k m [k g (1 k )u](B C)t● rp , (7c)
t mj
where g and u are the densities of desirable and undesirable
individuals at threshold similarity t. The total selective
pressure on the threshold value is thus
2 2 2 2dw rk gB [C rk (BC)m ][k g (1 k )u]t● rp . (7d)
dt m●
Setting this pressure to 0 leads to the ES threshold
2 2k gbp (1 k )u, (7e)
where
2rB [C rk (B C)m ]r
bp (7f)
2C rk (B C)mr
is the relative net benefit of social interactions. Substituting
21 (t h)
gp exp
2 2jj 2p hh
(from the normal distribution) in (7e) (as well as the
corresponding expression for u) provides, after some re-
arrangements,
2 21 h (1 k )1 1  2tp  (1 h )n n 2 ln . (7g)
2{ [ ]}h nh k bt
Equation (7e) receives the intuitive interpretation that
the marginal benefit of accepting a desirable recipient (left-
hand side) must match the marginal cost of accepting an
undesirable recipient. Or, in other words, at t, the ratio
of mistaken ( ) to correct ( g) interactions must2 2[1 k ]u k
equal the relative net benefit of a social interaction. If
dispersal is complete ( ) or altruism brings no ben-kp 0
efits ( ), then the optimal ratio u/g vanishes so thatbp 0
the optimal threshold tends to infinity (accept nobody).
This is also directly clear from equation (7g). If, by con-
trast, philopatry becomes complete (and provided benefits
are non-null), then the threshold tends to minus infinity
(accept everyone). Remember, however, that altruism be-
comes neutral at the limit .kp 1
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Figure 3: Plane projections of the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs)
for all evolving variables (altruism p, philopatry k, and acceptance thresh-
old t). Each of the ESSs equations (5e), (6e), and (7e) define a surface
in the three-dimensional (p-k-t) space. Two-by-two intersections of these
surfaces define curves in this three-dimensional space, the projections of
which are plotted here. For example, the solid curve in A is the joint
solution to (5e) and (7e) projected on the p-k plane, while the dashed
curve is the solution to (6e) and (7e) projected on the same plane.
Parameter values were set to , , , , and2Np 4 np 10 m p 1 h p 0.50
, , and . A, Evolutionarily stable (ES) altruism p0.4 3ep 0.5 Bp p Cp p
(solid line) increases monotonically with philopatry k, while ES philopatry
k (dashed line) first increases, then decreases with altruism p. B, Altruism
(solid line) increases drastically with the threshold t, while the latter shows
only a light increase with altruism. C, Philopatry (dashed line) is highly
sensitive to changes in the threshold value, while the latter increases only
slightly with the former.
Numerical Evaluations
The joint optimum for the three traits must be found by
simultaneous solution of the three separate ES equations.
These were evaluated numerically (using Mathematica;
Wolfram 1991) for a range of parameter values. Equilib-
rium relatedness was obtained from recurrence equations
that account for the effect of patch size, dispersal rate, and
differential fecundity of residents (app. B). The parameters
defining the costs and benefits of altruism had fixed values
in all simulations shown here (namely, and0.4Bp p
; fig. 2). Figure 3 displays the ESSs for each of the3Cp p
three evolving traits (altruism p, philopatry k, and accep-
tance threshold t) as functions of the two others. Each
two-dimensional curve represents the best response (i.e.,
ESS) of the variable plotted on one axis to changes imposed
to the variable on the other axis, while the third variable
is allowed to adapt. In the examples shown, heritability
and between-group environmental variance were set to
intermediate values ( ), while other param-2h p ep 0.5
eters were fixed to , , , andnp 10 Np 4 m p 1 sp0
.0.9
Figure 3A shows that philopatry (dashed line) first in-
creases, then decreases with investments in altruism. This
stems from the dependence of a (eq. [6f]) on the net
benefit of altruism ( ) that first increases then de-B C
creases with p (fig. 2). Philopatry is selected as long as
altruism brings more benefits than costs, excessive in-
vestments selecting for “selfish” dispersal. In turn, altruism
(solid line) responds drastically to changes in philopatry,
disappearing when dispersal is complete ( ) and ac-kp 0
cruing progressively to its maximal value as philopatry
tends to unity (though becoming a neutral character at
the limit).
Figure 3B shows strong interactions between altruism
(solid line) and acceptance threshold (dashed line). A low
threshold (tolerant actors) prevents altruism because many
nonrelatives then become recipients, while a high thresh-
old (intolerant actors) drives it to its maximal value be-
cause recipients have a much higher probability to be rel-
atives. Reciprocally, the optimal threshold increases
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Figure 4: Effects of dispersal costs on evolutionarily stable philopatry
and altruism depend on the structure of recognition traits. Open circles
and dotted lines, ; shaded triangles and dashed lines, ; filled2 2h p 0 h p 0.5
diamonds and solid lines, . If the common-environment compo-2h p 1
nent (e) is low (A), then the emergence of sociality requires dispersal
costs and can only rely on traits with high heritability. As e increases (B
and C), dispersal costs lose their importance, provided cues are non-
heritable. At large e values (C), nonheritable cues always do better, and
sociality emerges independently of dispersal costs. Other parameter val-
ues: , , .Np 4 np 10 m p 10
significantly as altruism is increased, which prevents high
investments from being wasted on nonrelatives.
Figure 3C shows the interactions between acceptance
threshold and philopatry. The latter (dashed line) displays
a nonmonotonic relation with t, stemming from its de-
pendence on a (eqq. [6e]–[6f]). The function (G U)
declines rapidly on each side of a maximum given by the
crossing of the two bell curves (fig. 1C). By contrast, the
threshold (solid line) is only slightly affected by philopatry
and actually increased. This is a nontrivial result. Equation
(7e) implies that the ratio u/g should increase as k increases
so that t should decrease (fig. 1). It turns out, however,
that increasing k also increases r and p (see fig. 3A), which
both affect b (eq. [7f]). This indirect effect cancels out
the direct effect of k over much of the range and overweigh
it at large k values.
For the set of parameters chosen, these best-response
curves intersect at about , , andtp 0.22 kp 0.8 pp
, which are the three-traits ESS searched (all inner0.165
equilibria discussed here were found numerically to be
continuously stable).
Figure 4 shows the effect of varying dispersal cost on
the evolutionarily stable philopatry (k) and altruism (p),
for different values of heritability (h2) and common en-
vironment (e). The main effect of dispersal costs is to favor
philopatry, which, in turn, enhances altruism. However,
the strength of this effect varies drastically with h2 and e.
Let us first consider a situation where groups have no
common environmental variance ( ; fig. 4A). Lowep 0
dispersal costs ( ) foster very high dispersal so thatsp 0.99
altruism remains extremely limited. A slight increase in
costs ( ) boosts philopatry more than altruism.sp 0.95
Gene flow is still too high, not only to build up significant
relatedness but, more importantly, to allow good discrim-
ination. As costs further increase, philopatry reaches values
that allow more altruism to evolve but only insofar as a
high heritability in recognition traits ( ) permits2h p 1
good discrimination. Otherwise, the large overlap in rec-
ognition traits (due to the individual component of en-
vironmental variance) prevents efficient recognition. The
maximal altruism is reached as philopatry tends to unity
and for traits with perfect heritability. This point corrob-
orates Lacy and Sherman’s (1983) result, which showed
under similar assumptions (continuous traits with no
common-environment component) that high heritability
improves recognition (their fig. 8).
The introduction of a common-environment term into
recognition traits ( ; fig. 4B) changes nothing ifep 0.25
traits have perfect heritability (because similarity in this
case does not depend on e; eq. [2c]) but improves dis-
crimination (thus enhancing altruism and philopatry) if
traits have lower heritability. Discrimination exceeds that
for high-heritability traits at high dispersal (because re-
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Figure 5: Effective population size (N) affects the consequences of dis-
persal costs on evolutionarily stable philopatry and altruism. Symbols as
in figure 4. At small N values ( in B vs. 10 in A), high relatednessNp 2
boosts altruism, and also dispersal (because of kin competition), so that
varying group size produces a negative correlation between altruism and
philopatry. High relatedness (small N) furthermore provides advantages
to genetic cues. Other parameter values: , , .ep 0.25 np 10 m p 10
semblance among patch mates is mediated by their com-
mon environment and, thereby, is not affected by gene
flow) but not at high philopatry (because similarity then
stems more from common ancestry). The several curves
generated by different heritability values cross at the point
where discrimination is unaffected by heritability, localized
at the dispersal-rate value that equalizes r and e (eq. [2c]).
As e becomes complete ( ; fig. 4C), discriminationep 1
improves drastically for low-heritability traits. The crossing
of the curves now shifts totally on the right border because
complete philopatry is required to induce a relatedness of
1. The best discrimination (and thus highest altruism and
philopatry) are always achieved when recognition traits
show no heritability. Altruism is then completely inde-
pendent of dispersal costs, and philopatry shows only
slight dependence because it is driven by the benefits of
kin interaction much more than by the costs of dispersal.
That e only matters when h2 is low comes from obvious
reasons. As environmental variation vanishes, it becomes
irrelevant whether e occurs within or among patches (eq.
[2c]).
Figure 5 shows the effect of variations in group size. As
N decreases from 10 to 2, relatedness increases (eq. [B8]),
which enhances both dispersal (because kin competition
becomes very significant) and altruism (because recipients
are more related), especially at high dispersal costs and
philopatry values. The crossing of the curves shifts on the
left because at small group size a lower philopatry is re-
quired for relatedness to match a given e value. Thus,
genetic cues should be preferred at small effective-group
size and environmental cues should be preferred at large
group size.
Figure 6 finally shows altruism and philopatry to depend
on the number of traits examined, increasing rapidly with
n at low n values, then leveling off. The evaluation of more
traits allows the sampling variance in similarity to decrease
(cf. fig. 1A and 1B), which reduces strongly the overlap
of distributions when variance is large but much less so
when it is already low. Thus, the benefits of sampling more
traits show diminishing returns. If there were any costs to
the sampling process (not implemented here), then the
optimal number of traits to be sampled could be inferred
(and would presumably depend on both h2 and e).
Discussion
Discrimination ability plays a key role in the evolution of
sociality by promoting altruism through the decoupling
of social and economic neighborhoods. Errors in kin rec-
ognition, therefore, lower the optimal investments in al-
truism and thereby lower the benefits expected from phil-
opatry and kin interactions. This has the potential to
impede the evolution of social structures. The conse-
quences, developed below, are first that the costs of dis-
persal (as opposed to the benefits of philopatry) play a
major role in promoting sociality when discrimination is
low but much less so when discrimination is high. Second,
not only should natural selection favor an optimal accep-
tance threshold but also the use of cues that maximize
discrimination.
Dispersal Costs and Sociality
Perrin and Lehmann (2001) found that ecological con-
straints are required for the emergence of altruism if kin
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Figure 6: A, A large number of recognition traits (n) increase philopatry,
so that n induces a positive correlation between altruism and philopatry.
B, For a given expected similarity , the amount of altruism concededh¯
(p) increases with the number of recognition traits (n) because of the
concomitant reduction in sampling variance (see fig. 1) but at a decel-
erating pace (negative second derivative).
discrimination is spatially based. In contrast, associative
learning may favor altruism even in complete absence of
dispersal costs. The situation investigated here shows a
continuum between these two outcomes. In the case of
perfect discrimination ( , , n is large), dispersal2h p 0 ep 1
costs have no effect whatsoever on the equilibrium altru-
ism value and only a slight effect on philopatry because
the benefits of altruism suffice to counteract the costs of
kin competition (fig. 4C). As discrimination worsens (fig.
4A), costs become more and more important in preventing
kin competition to drive complete dispersal. This result
confirms that kin-discrimination ability has a significant
role to play in the debate as to whether sociality is driven
by the costs of dispersal or the benefits of philopatry (Sta-
cey and Ligon 1991). An empirically relevant corollary is
the negative correlation expected between the cognitive
capacities of organisms and the importance of ecological
constraints in molding social structures.
Another potentially interesting empirical prediction
stemming from the patterns documented here is that so-
ciality is likely to be maintained by high dispersal costs in
those species that use genetic cues for kin discrimination.
Indeed, our analysis shows (fig. 4) that high dispersal costs
are always required for sociality to emerge if recognition
traits have a high heritability.
Optimal Acceptance Threshold
The situation investigated here most closely matches
Reeve’s (1989, p. 417) “frequency-dependent context with
pair-wise kin interactions.” Introducing his first-order
condition (12) into his fitness equation (11) provides the
equilibrium condition
u k rB C
p
g 1 k C
(using our symbols and our assumption that relatedness
with undesirable recipients is 0). Although the global in-
terpretation is similar (at equilibrium, the marginal ben-
efits of accepting a desirable recipient match the marginal
costs of accepting an undesirable one), this equation differs
from ours (7e) on two points. First, we obtain k 2 and
instead of k and because we also include the21 k 1 k
possibility that the focal individual may end up as an im-
migrant. Second, we integrate kin competition, which adds
further costs to altruism. But more importantly, the ac-
counting of dynamic interactions introduces important
indirect effects that drastically affect the expected outcome.
First, as already noted, the frequency of interactions with
desirable recipients (k) increases t (fig. 3C) rather than
decreasing it because of indirect effects on the relative net
benefit of social interactions (b). Similarly, though the
optimal threshold is indeed expected to decrease as the
benefits of altruism increase (Reeve 1989), it happens to
increase with altruistic investments (fig. 3B) because local
competition renders misguided investments very costly.
Increasing the threshold prevents investments from being
wasted on unrelated recipients.
Relatedness with desirable recipients also shows com-
plex interactions. On the one hand, it increases the benefits
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of altruism (thereby selecting for a lower threshold), but
on the other hand, it increases similarity with desirable
recipients (eq. [2c]), thereby selecting for a higher thresh-
old (eq. [7g]). The resulting balance is bound to depend
on the heritability of recognition traits since a low heri-
tability would cancel the effect of relatedness on similarity.
Finally, the number of traits investigated (n) is shown to
affect the threshold (eq. [7g]) by reducing the sampling
variance of similarities.
Genetic versus Environmental Cues
Lacy and Sherman (1983) showed that when similarity
between kin is solely the result of additive genetic variation
then increasing cue heritability improves recognition. They
did not investigate environmental cues but suggested these
might reduce kin recognition errors if environment affects
the phenotypes of kin classes differentially. According to
our results, the best kin discrimination (and thereby the
highest altruism and philopatry) is indeed achieved by
using recognition traits with low heritability and a high
between-group component of environmental variance (fig.
4C). This combination boosts similarity among patch
mates (eq. [2c]) at gene-flow values that would otherwise
induce much overlap in heritable traits. High h values not
only drive apart the expectations of similarity distributions
for residents and immigrants but also reduce their sam-
pling variance (eq. [3]), which contributes to improve
discrimination.
Though the cuticular hydrocarbon profiles of honeybees
possess enough discriminating power to allow for genet-
ically based kin recognition (Arnold et al. 1996), guards
use exclusively environmental cues acquired in the adult
stage when encountering entering bees (Downs and Rat-
nieks 1999). (Whether genetic cues are used at all for
patrilineal recognition within hives remains a disputed is-
sue; Breed et al. 1994). Environmental similarity in odors
among nest mates in social insects has been shown to stem
either from the use of common sources of food or from
contact with the common-nest material (Crosland 1989a).
Aggressiveness among colonies of the leaf-cutting ant Ac-
romyrmex octospinosus drops when they are fed the same
food (Jutsum et al. 1979). Honeybee colonies or sister
groups fed the same flavored syrup accept transferred
workers but reject workers fed syrup of a different flavor
(references in Downs and Ratnieks 1999). The peculiar
blend of plants (dictated by colony environment) used by
colonies of Polistes fuscatus wasps to build their nest du-
rably impregnate bee nymphs with a colony-specific odor
(Gamboa et al. 1996). Waxcomb plays a similar role in
honeybees (Breed at al. 1988, 1995), thus allowing nest-
mate recognition to develop within a few days of colony
swarming (Breed et al. 1998).
However, traits with high heritability become preferable
as soon as relatedness exceeds the between-group com-
ponent of environmental variance. This may arise when
severe dispersal costs induce a strong philopatry (fig. 4B)
or when small group size boosts relatedness (fig. 5). By
group size, we refer here to the effective number of breed-
ers, not to the actual number of individuals. Ant colonies
with one singly mated queen obviously belong in this cat-
egory, whatever the number of workers. Relatedness
among sisters in this case theoretically reaches values as
high as 0.75 (due to the haplodiploid sex-determining sys-
tem of hymenopterans), which presumably exceeds the
between-group environmental component of most phe-
notypic traits. Highly heritable recognition traits are likely
to be chosen in this case.
Rare alleles allow better discrimination. Frequency-
dependent selection acting in large populations should
thus maintain significant heritabilities in recognition traits
over evolutionary times (Ratnieks 1991). However, the
drop in genetic variance following population bottlenecks
may generate unexpected side effects. Unicoloniality in the
invading Argentine ant (Linepithema humile) apparently
results from the loss of genetic diversity in recognition
traits due to founder effects (Tsutsui et al. 2000). Natural
populations in native habitats show a high genetic diver-
sity, high discrimination ability, and high relatedness
among nest mates, contrasting drastically with unicolonial
invading populations. According to our results, however,
the drop in relatedness among nest mates may confer ad-
vantages to environmental cues (fig. 4B). An evolutionary
shift to such cues would, in turn, restore multicoloniality.
Whether unicoloniality in invading ants is indeed a tran-
sient state due to the breakdown of recognition systems
is a fascinating hypothesis that deserves continued em-
pirical investigation.
Empirical evidence suggests that recognition cues usu-
ally lay in a continuum between purely genetic and pri-
marily environmental (Ratnieks 1991), which presumably
arises from the balance between several interacting factors.
In addition to small effective size and high dispersal costs
(both of which favor genetic cues), cognitive ability should
matter. The evolved brains of higher vertebrates should
facilitate the transmission and interpretation of nongenetic
information. The structure of environmental variance is
obviously also of prime importance. Environmental cues
should be favored in coarse-grained habitats showing most
heterogeneity at a large spatial scale (among patches),
while genetic cues might be preferred in homogeneous or
fine-grained habitats, in which important small-scale het-
erogeneity may amplify individual differences (within-
patch variance) for environmentally determined pheno-
typic traits.
However, the possibility of an active manipulation of
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the variance components of recognition traits has also to
be considered. Any decrease in individual (within group)
environmental variance will enhance e (proportion of en-
vironmental variance that is due to differences between
groups), thus improving discrimination and altruism. This
may be achieved by standardization of recognition traits
among patch mates, either through individual adoption
of a common standard or by mixing up and sharing of
cues at the group level. Trophallaxis in social insects may
also serve the purpose of homogenizing food-mediated
environmental cues (Dahbi et al. 1999). Nest mates in
several ant species have been shown to exchange and share
cuticular hydrocarbons through mutual licking and passive
contact (Soroker et al. 1994, 1995; Vienne et al. 1995). By
reducing the interindividual component of environmental
variance, these exchanges create a colony-specific odor, the
so-called gestalt chemical signature (Crozier and Dix 1979;
Stuart 1987, 1988; Crosland 1989b; Tsuji 1990; Dahbi and
Lenoir 1998a, 1998b). Only the environmental component
of recognition traits is of course affected in the process,
not their genetic part (relatedness is unchanged). Albeit
individually produced odors might be under complete ge-
netic control, the odor of nest mates is definitely part of
the environment. Similar mixing of individual odors to
form a unique recognition cue has been found in bees
(Breed and Julian 1992) and in naked mole-rats (O’riain
and Jarvis 1997). Polydomous ant colonies may also
exchange workers to maintain a uniform odor over mul-
tiple nests (Dahbi et al. 1997).
In social vertebrates, vocalization convergence within
social units may play a similar function. Sonar signals of
big brown bats (Eptesicus fuscus) contain information
about family affiliation (Masters et al. 1995). Acoustic con-
vergence within social groups and differences between
groups in greater spear-nosed bats (Phyllostomus hastatus)
arise through vocal learning (Boughman 1998). Flock-
specific call differences observed in black-capped chicka-
dees arise through a process of mutual imitation (Nowicki
1989). Males of the cooperatively breeding stripe-backed
wren (Campylorhynchus nuchalis) learn repertoires of ste-
reotyped calls from older male relatives. As a result, these
vocalizations are normally specific to patrilineal family
groups (Price 1999). A similar process may occur in hu-
mans, who show an impressive propensity to comply with
the cultural peculiarities of the group they are born in, in
terms of language (dialects and accents), habits, manners,
and customs as well as ornaments (tribal clothes, ritual
paintings or tattoos; Cordell and Schwartz 1979). Cultural
adornments take an important discrimination function as
soon as contacts among distinct communities become fre-
quent (Delaporte 1990). Genetically based recognition
traits would definitely not allow easy discrimination on
small geographical scales. Human meticulous compliance
with social standards might thus have been partly selected
for recognition purpose through its efficient increase of
the between-group component of environmental variance
and concomitant decrease in within-group variance.
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APPENDIX A
Table A1: Symbols used in the model
Symbol Definition
x Dispersal probability
p Investment in altruism
t Similarity threshold above which potential recipients are accepted
s Survival probability during dispersal
N Number of breeding females per patch
˜ ˜k { x /(x  sx)x j jj Probability that an individual breeding in the focal patch was born locally
Cp Fecundity cost of providing altruism, an accelerating function of p (fig. 2)
Bp Fecundity benefit of receiving altruism, a decelerating function of p (fig. 2)
e Proportion of the environmental variance in phenotypic traits due to differences among groups
2h Heritability of a trait (proportion of phenotypic variance that is additive genetic)
h¯ Expectation of phenotypic similarity among patch mates
g t Probability that a female born in the same patch as the focal one has similarity t to her.
Similarity may range minus infinity to plus infinity, though its expectation ( ) ranges 0–1 (fig. 1)h¯
ut Probability that a female stemming from a different patch than the focal one displays a
similarity t to her (fig. 1)

G { g dt∫tptt t Probability of accepting a desirable recipient, function of the threshold t

U { u dt∫tptt t Probability of accepting an undesirable recipient
mo Baseline fecundity of a breeding female (fecundity in absence of social interaction)
, 2m jr r Average and variance in the progeny of a breeding resident female
mi,
2ji Average and variance in the progeny of a breeding immigrant female
˜m{ km  kmr i Average fecundity per female in the whole metapopulation
m {m /mr r Relative fecundity of a resident
m {m /mi i Relative fecundity of an immigrant
a{ (m m )/mr i i Relative gain in progeny of residents over immigrants
v Average coancestry among individuals born on the same patch (probability that alleles sampled
from two individuals are identical by descent)
2Fp k vmr Average inbreeding (probability that an individual bears two alleles identical by descent)
rp 2v/(1 F) Average relatedness among individuals born on the same patch, equal to the coancestry among
them divided by coancestry with self
Pi Probability that two offspring share a same parent of sex i
Qij Probability that the parent (sex i) of a random offspring and the parent (sex j) of another random
offspring were different individuals but both resident
Note: Traits have subscript dot when expressed in the focal individual. Subscript j designates average value of the trait in individuals from the
same patch as the focal female (and bearing with her relatedness r), and absence of subscript dot denotes the average value for the whole
metapopulation. Tilde denotes the complement to unity (e.g., ).˜P { 1 Pm m
APPENDIX B
Dynamics of Relatedness
General Equations
Our recurrence equation is derived along the lines proposed by Nagylaki (1995) and Wang (1997). The coancestry
( ) between two offspring born on the same patch is the probability that two alleles randomly sampled, one fromvt1
each offspring, are identical by descent (IBD).
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First, with probability one-fourth, both alleles were inherited along the paternal lines. If the offspring share the same
father, then IBD probability is . If fathers differ, then IBD probability equals their coancestry. Under infinite-(1 F)/2t
island assumptions, this means vt if both fathers were born locally and 0 otherwise. Thus, paternal descent ensures a
coancestry of
1 1 FtP Q v ,m mm t( )4 2
where Pm is the probability that two random offspring share the same father and Qmm is the probability that their
fathers differed, but both were resident.
Second, with probability one-fourth, both alleles were inherited from mothers. Using the same reasoning, maternal
descent ensures a coancestry of
1 1 FtP Q v ,f ff t( )4 2
where Pf is the probability that two random offspring share the same mother and Qff is the probability that their
mothers differed, but both were resident.
Finally, with probability one-half, these alleles were inherited, one from a mother and one from a father. The IBD
probability in that case equals the expected coancestry among these parents, Qfmvt, where Qfm measures the probability
that a random male and a random female were both born locally.
Collecting all these terms provides the recurrence equation for coancestry:
1 1 Ft
v p (P  P)  (Q Q  2Q )v . (B1)t1 m f mm ff fm t[ ( ) ]4 2
Since , dividing both sides by provides the corresponding equation for relatedness. At equi-rp 2v/(1 F) (1 F)/2t
librium ( ), we thus obtainr p r p rt1 t
P  Pm frp . (B2)
4Q Q  2Qmm ff fm
Specific Relationships
Assuming similar dispersal rates by males and females, the Qij probabilities are given by
mr 2Q p k , (B3)fm m
Nk 1
Q p k , (B4a)mm N
2 2Nk[m (Nk 1) j ]r rQ p . (B4b)ff Nm(Nm 1)
Under random mating, the probability that two offspring share the same father is
1
P p . (B5)m N
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For females, the relation is more complex since different categories of mothers (immigrants and residents) have
different fecundities. The corresponding probability is thus a sum over several categories:
˜P p p Nk p Nk, (B6)f i r
where
2j m (m  1)i i i
p p (B7a)i Nm(Nm 1)
is the probability that two random offspring share one particular immigrant mother and
2j m (m  1)r r r
p p (B7b)r Nm(Nm 1)
is the corresponding probability for a resident mother. From the binomial distribution, the variances in the progeny
of immigrant and resident mothers are and , respectively. Substitut-2 2j p m [1 (m /Nm)] j p m [1 (m /Nm)]i i i r r r
ing these values into (B7a), (B7b), and (B6) provides , , and . Equation2 2 2 2˜p p (m /N) p p (m /N) P p (1/N) (km  km )i i r r f r i
(B2) thus becomes
2 2˜1 km  kmr irp . (B8)
2 2 2˜4N k[(Nk 1)/(N 1)](2N 1 km  km ) 2k Nr i
If resident and immigrant females have the same fecundity ( ), then (B8) reduces to the basic equationm p m p 1r i
for randomly mating dioecious species:
1
rp . (B9)
22N(1 k ) k
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